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【1】
"Can there ever be the 21st century?", asked Jean-Paul Sartre. 
Together with Simone de Beauvoir, he continued to warn against 
the threat of nuclear war and to remind the intellectual community 
of the West of its obligation to avert this disaster to humanity. 
But Sartre and Beauvoir had died by the middle of the eighties, 
while Gorvachev rose to power and led the Soviet Union on a 
course of history which marked the end of the Cold War. In 
1989, at the bicentennial anniversary of the French Revolution, 
we saw the Berlin Wall come down, and the rigid political system 
of the Eastern Block nations convulse. In 1991, the Soviet Union 
ended its 70 year old history. 
At first, we could have expected the threat of nuclear war to 
disappear. But the outbreak of the Gulf War darkened our hopes 
that the post-Cold War period would be free of any large-scale 
hostilities. The tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western 
world may have eased, but the unresolved problems with the 
Arab nations soon dampened the sense of security which the 
West had enjoyed for a brief spell. In what was formerly the 
Soviet Union, new and old claims for nationalism became rampant; 
especially in the old Yugoslavia, the cruel reports of ethnic 
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cleansing overshadowed our daily news. Concentration camps 
seem no longer to belong to the forgotten past. The specter of 
Neo-nazism is looming in the newly united Germany, and the 
rising expectations of economic growth, now suddenly put on hold, 
begin to shake the political foundations of many industrialized 
nations. At the same time the poverty-stricken Third World is 
beginning to sense the injustice that exists in the current world 
order. The next century would certainly become a reality contrary 
to the fear of Sartre and Beauvoir, but it will inherit al the 
ugly problems which had been overshadowed and forcibly sup-
pressed by the struggle between the Super Powers. Today's 
situation, globally speaking, is no less turbulent, no less dishearten-
ing than half a century ago, when Hannah Arendt, at the epicenter 
of Europe's turmoil, embarked on a philosophical career. She 
emerged, after thirty years of intense personal experience and 
thinking, as a spokesperson for those who are displaced, homeless, 
disadvantaged, persecuted, and ethnically and sexually discrim-
inated. With a voice of inner fortitude and clarlity of vision, 
she compels us today to retrace the process of the maturation 
of what is called uniquely the political philosophy of Hannah 
Arendt. 
【I】
At the risk of repeating what people may already know about 
Arendt's personal history, I will briefly sketch the stages of her 
development. Hannah Arendt was born in the suburb of Hannover 
in nothern Germany in 1906. Her parents were members of the 
Social Democratic Party which was illegal at that time. They 
were "well-integrated" German Jews with moderate political 
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convictions. Hannah lost her father at the age of 7, and her mother 
re-married when she was 14. 
In 1924, at the age of 18, Hannah Arendt entered the Department 
of Philosophy of the University of Marburg, and there she met 
the young Heidegger, who, at the age of 35, stil two years before 
the publication of Being and Time, was already recognized among 
German universities as an exceptional teacher. Arendt contributed 
an article to Heidegger's 80th birthday in 1969, and two years 
later, in 1971, its English translation appeared in the New York 
Review of Books (October 21). Let me quote a few lines from 
this article. 
Heidegger's'fame'predates by about eight years the 
publication of Being and Time in 1927; indeed it is open to 
question whether the unusual success of this book would 
have been possible if it had not been preceded by the teacher's 
reputation among the students, in whose opinion, at any 
rate, the book's success merely confirmed what they had 
known for many years. — There was something strange about 
this early fame, stranger perhaps than the fame of Kafka 
in the early twenties or of Braque and Picasso in the preced-
ing decade, who were also unknown to what is commonly 
understood as the public and nevertheless exerted an extraor-
dinary influence. 
Arendt then mentions Jaspers as a philosopher who differed 
from those who belonged to traditional "circles". "What these 
few had in common was—to put it in Heidegger's words 
that they could distinguish'between an object of scholarship' 
Cl) 
and'a matter of thought'." (Cf. W. Biemel, M. Heidegger. 
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An Illustrated Study, Harvest 1976, 1-5) 
This last quote in which "matter of thought" was contrasted 
with "object of scholarship", was to become the key phrase for 
Arendt's political philosophy that outlived the mutual fascination 
between the German philosopher and his Jewish disciple. 
In 1926, when the environment of her study in Marburg became 
less and less agreeable, Arendt went to Karl Jaspers in Heidelberg. 
Under Jaspers'supervision, she wrote her doctoral dissertation, 
"The Concept of Love in Augustine". At this time, she was 
merely twenty three years old. Derwent May, in his study of 
Hannah Arendt published in 1986, describes the thrust of this 
dissertation in the following words : 
It is an austere, systematic study, relating Augustine's differ-
ent concepts of love to the human experience of the time. The 
greatest value of this work to her was probably the deeper ac。
quaintance it gave her with early Christian thought about virtue 
and political life, which helped her more sharply to define 
(2) 
her own ideas in due course in The Human Condition. 
Though Jaspers recommended to Arendt to apply for a teaching 
career in Germany, she chose to remain an independent thinker, 
and soon had to leave Germany under the mounting pressure of 
anti-Semitism. In 1933, she left for France. For a time, she helped 
the children of exiled Jews to find homes in Palesteine, but she 
became critical of the Zionist movement because she had a 
different notion about the way the "Jewish State" should be 
structured, and withdrew from this movement completely. And 
in 1941, she sought with her mother and Heinrich Briicher refuge 
in the United States. She married Heinrich Briicher in 1940. He 
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became her lifelong partner in conversation, the fruition of 
which can be seen in The Origins of Totaritarianism (1951)_ 
This book, 18 years after she left Germany, threw her, at 
the age of 45, suddenly into the limelight of the academic 
community. According to H. Stuart Hughes, the author of the 
three volume treatment of the history of ideas of the 20th 
century, The Sea Change (1930-1965), Arendt's Origins of Totari-
tarianism is "the most learned and incisive" work addressing the 
pressing ideological situation of the time. 
Before I introduce some critical observations about this book, 
I should mention that my own encounter with Arendt's work 
was not entirely without the elements of shared feeling for the 
crisis of our modern times. Growing up as a teenager in post-war 
Japan, I had my own set of problems, but in order to predispose 
me to pursue the study of philosophy, the society around me 
must have had more than its ordinary share of incentive to put 
me in a philosophically reflective mood. I recall being taken to 
church by my mother who was a Christian. I was christened at 
the age of 18. It was at this time that I started to question the 
meaning of religion, and this penchant I carried into the selection 
of my major at college, and I thus enrolled in the department 
of philosophy of Osaka University. My freshman year in college 
was also the year when Japanese universities were swept by the 
campaign against the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty. Though 
skepticism drove me to philosophical reflection, there was now 
the question of meaningful action was inseparably interwoven 
with it. 
Thus by the time I had in my hand Hannah Arendt's Politiral 
Philosophy (edited with an Interpretative Essay by Ronald Beiner), 
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I knew that I had been waiting eagerly for this kind of book for 
some time. Much in the same vein as Margaret Canovan, who 
is the author of The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt (London, 
1974), who stated that she understood Arendt'work from within 
with an inner sympathy, I would confirm that an important book 
by an author of the same sex had the same direct appeal to me, 
though I was soon to learn that whatever narrow, self-centered 
views, including feminist principles, were something to be trans-
cended in order to approach the level of Arendt's political think-
ing. Nor can I deny that Arendt's original interpretation and ap-
propriation of Kant greatly fascinated me, because as a student 
of philosophy, I wrote my first paper on Kant's humanism, 
But after al, it was the total blend of Hannah Arendt'philosophy, 
her grasp of the human condition in the most penetrating way 
imaginable, and the unique and original individuality of her 
thinking that gave me a sense of direction for my own life and 
work. 
I shall now return to her major work, The Origins of Totali-
tarianism. Even though Stuart Hughes'overall assessment of this 
book was positive, he noted in his Sea Change that Arendt 
treated Nazism and Stalinism in the same dimension, and he 
criticized the fact that she overlooked the difference between the 
national-socialist form of totalitarianism and its Soviet counter-
part. According to Hughes, such a difference derives its roots 
from the divergent economic systems and the power structures 
that are inherent in them. Arendt could not possibly have know-
ledge of economic theories, considering the nature of her scholarly 
training ; thus, concluded Hughes, her work fel rapidly behind 
the time. Today, twenty years later, in light of what has transpired 
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in the former Soviet Union, we are entitled to ask whether it 
was not Hughes'more narrowly timebound analysis that was 
surpassed by the progress of events. I am certain that our age 
of post-modernism has not outlived the relevance of the political 
philosophy of Arendt. For what makes her view-point enduringly 
unique is derived from her original thought style. 
She is careful to distinguish'thought'from'cognition' 
the search for specific knowledge, and from'logic'一 the
following of rational trains of thought to their logical conclu-
sion. Now what Arendt means by thought, and what her 
works present as the result thereof, is a quite different 
activity. It can be learned and practised, but it cannot be 
taught by inculcating a method, nor can rules be prescribed 
for it. It consists in the endless effort of human beings to 
make sense of what they experience, to get their minds round 
the things that confront them, the activities they engage in, 
(3) 
and above al, the events that happen among them." 
Her work is political thought, in the sense of representing 
the free play of political thought of an individual mind round 
politics, making sense of political events and placing them 
within an unfolding understanding of al that comes within that 
mind's range. Further, "thinking is the faculty that creates cosmos 
out of chaos, that gives us, instead of bits of unrelated data or 
self-enclosed chains of reasoning, a mental world to move in that 
is adequated to reality. Such thinking is necessarily an individual 
(3) 
activity." In this way, her thought is very unique and has a 
disconcerting implication for an age where uniformity is 
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regarded as a hallmark of truth, where no two thinking people 
will ever think quite alike. It is also easy to see that Arendt 
owes this "existentiell" notion of thought to Heidegger and 
Jaspers. But, for her part, she much more openly acknowledged 
her indebtedness to the political philosophy of Kant, and with 
a good reason. She did not turn to Kant in the ordinary sense, 
looking for a guidance in his writings on ethics, political 
philosophy and philosophy of history. Characteristically, it was 
the Critique of Judgement and not the Critique of Practical 
Reason that Arendt interprets as the source from which insight 
can be gained in coming to terms with political reality. 
For the Critique of Practical Reason is dominated by the categori-
cal imperative that compels you to act always in such a manner 
that the principle of y o u r action can become a general law. 
Hannah Arendt points out that this law derives its force from the 
notion of consistency, of agreeing with oneself, that is essential 
to rational thought. But the kind of thinking that Kant describes 
in the Critique of Judgement consists, he says, of common sense 
(sensus communis) i. e. "enlarged mind" which is able to "think 
in the place of everybody else" (an der Stelle jedes Anderen 
(5) 
denken). ―ーIn fact judgement as described by Kant strikes 
Arendt as being a peculiarly p o 1 i t i c a 1 capacity, because 
it involves thinking (actually or in imagination) in the presence 
of others, considering their viewpoints as well as one's own and 
seeking their acceptance of one's judgement. In being so intrinsical-
ly related to others, to our sharing of the world, and to the 
common sense that belongs to that common world, it is quite 
different from philosophical thinking, which Hannah Arendt sees 
as the essentially singleminded pursuit of truth, within one mind 
， 
and outside and beyond the world of common sense. But Arendt 
had not thought about al this when she wrote The Origins of 
Totalitarianism. In this book, she stil tried to be rational in her 
pursuit of the reasons why the nightmares of this century had 
to happen. The revolution in her thinking occured after the trial 
of Adolf Eichmann in 1961. 
【II】
R. Beiner writes in his interpretive essay of H. Arendt's 
political philosophy: "According to Hannah Arendt,'thought 
itself arises out of incidents of living experience and must remain 
bound to them as the only guideposts by which to take its 
bearings'. If this is so, what particular experience gave rise to 
(6) 
her theory of judging?" Everyone will point to her study on the 
rise of totalitarianism as one of such experiences. For, as Beiner 
explains, it alerted Arendt to the complexities of human judgement 
and to the threat posed to it by developments in modern society. 
But there is good reason for supposing that another, more 
specific, though obviously related'incident of living experience' 
precipitated her efforts to theorize about the nature of judgement, 
namely, her presence at the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem. 
Her report of the trial, which appeared in 1963, first in the New 
Yorker and then in book form, generated a huge storm of contro-
versy. Arendt herself informs us that her reflections on the 
status of truth and on the function of thought were motivated 
by her involvement in the Eichmann controversy. There is thus 
little reason to doubt that what was preoccupying her when she 
began to think seriously about judgement was the unavoidable 
need to render judgement in the case of Adolf Eichmann, together 
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with the fact that Eichmann himself clearly abstained from 
responsible judgement—-an evil generated by his thought-defying 
banality. According to Beiner, the Eichmann affair brought 
Arendt to a full awareness of judgement's function of assimilating 
in a humanly intelligible way whatever most strenuously resists 
such assimilation. Judgement brings its object of judgement within 
the reach of human meaningfulness. This is brought to light 
most strikingly in the exchange between Arendt and Gershom 
Scholem over the Eichmann question. Scholem wrote in his letter 
to Arendt :" There were among (the elders of the Jews) many 
people in no way different from ourselves, who were compelled 
to make terrible decisions in circumstances that we cannot even 
begin to reproduce or reconstruct. I do not know whether they 
were right or wrong. Nor do I presume to judge'I was not there'. 
Arendt replied:'(The behavior of Jewish functionaries) constitutes 
our part of the so-called'unmastered past', and although you 
may be right that it is too early for a balanced judgement 
(though I doubt this), I do believe that we shall only come to 
terms with this past if we begin to judge and to be frank about 
(7) 
it."'Thus judgement serves to help us make sense of, and to 
render humanly intelligible, events that otherwise could not be 
made so. The faculty of judgement is in the service that Arendt 
ascribes to the telling of excellent deeds in a story and conferring 
intelligibility is the meaning of politics. 
In this place, Beiner compares Arendt's'Eichmann in Jerusalem' 
with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Humanism and Terror, for both 
are similar moral dimensions. 
These two books are addressed to the two most extreme 
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(and most distressing) political experiences of our century, 
Nazism and Stalinism, respectively. What the two works share 
is that in both cases the effort to understand is at the center 
of their respective inquiries. When understanding is placed 
in the service of judgement, it requires the free exercise of 
imagination—in particular, the ability to imagine how things 
look from a position that we do not in fact occupy. Judgement 
may require us to make the effort to understand those whose 
point of view we not only do not share, but may even find 
highly distasteful. Disagreement does not release us from 
the responsibility to understand what we reject ; ifanything, 
(8) 
it rather heightens this responsibility. 
Bainer continues to write: 
“…for Merleau-Ponty, too, judgement assumes the tragic task of 
understanding and forgiving, these composing the tragic dimen-
sions of judgement." According to Merleau-Ponty, "true liberty 
takes others as they are, tries to understand even those doctrines 
which are its negation, and never allows itself to judge before 
understanding." "We must fulfil our freedom of thought in the 
(9) 
freedom of understanding". Arendt's efforts to come to terms 
with the experience of the Holocaust convey the same message. 
To judge a genuinely human situation is to partake of the tragedy 
that is potential in circumstances where human responsibility 
is exercised and borne to its limit. This helps to explain why 
Arendt associates the faculty of judging with the sense of human 
dignity. 
The case of Eichman is relevant for Hannah Arendt's theme 
of judgement in a twofold sense. In the first sense, Eichman 
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himself is seen as the judging subject, who, however, miserably 
fails in this capacity. There is a sheer abismal inability of this 
man to think and judge, —-to tel right from wrong, beautiful 
from ugly, — in the critical political situation in which he was 
involved. The lesson here is that the inability to think, not the 
ability to reason logically or think technically, but to discern 
what is the real issue in a total human context, has fatal implica-
tions for the faculty of judging. 
In the second sense, Arendt herself and her fellow American 
Jews are called upon to pass judgement. This is a "retrospective" 
judgement, and, as such, it poses a challenge to the very status 
of judgement. For the issue is whether one ought perhaps, out 
of concern or fear of committing a betrayal, to suspend judgement 
altogether. But Arendt is firm on this and insists on judging 
unconditionally. The lesson in this is that responsibility for 
making judgements cannot be shirked even when commitments 
and allegiances of a familial or national kind would seem to 
intrude upon the judgement itself. The activity of judging cannot 
be inhibited by supposedly prior relations of love or loyalty. 
Judgement must be free, and the condition of its autonomy is 
the ability to think. When freedom is portrayed thus as predicate 
to the power of i m a g i n a t i o n, it is easy to see why 
Arendt was drawn more to Kant's Critique of Judgiment than to 
his Critique of Practical Reason in her effort to round of her 
theory of political judgement. For imagination is here linked most 
closely with that en 1 a r g e d・mindwhich is political thinking par 
excellence, "because it enables us to put ourselves in the minds 
of other men." As a consequence, politics and culture are seen 
by Arendt as not essentially separate spheres of human activity. 
13 
Both are concerned how the w o r I d I o o k s, and how it appears 
to those who share it, and both attend to the quality of the worldly 
dwelling that envelops us and in which we pass our moral existence. 
Arendt introduces her discussion of judgement in connection 
with'the spectator'who apprehends cultural and political 
appearances. Kant's Critique of Judgement is now appealed 
to, she tells us, because, in the first part, the'Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgement', it offers'an analytic of the beautiful 
primarily from the view-point of the judging spectator'. This 
concern with the judging spectator is simply the extension 
of Arendt's definition of politics in terms of virtuosity or 
performance. The deeds of the actor are as in need of the 
spectator's judgement as those of any other performer. Arendt 
begins her account of this idea of spectatorship by calling 
attention to the p 1 u r a 1 i t y presupposed in judgement as 
(10) 
opposed to the solitary nature of thought. 
In regard to the Kantian notion of enlarged-mind to which we 
referred above, she now translates as "representative thinking" 
that is capable of thinking "from the standpoint of everyone 
else." This involves "potential agreement with others", but, unlike 
logical reasoning, it does not lay claim to universal validity. 
Rather, it appeals to judging persons who are "present'', who 
are members of the public realm where the objects of judgement 
appear. Later Hannah Arendt modifies this sense of representative 
thinking. In her writings during the 1970's, she no longer links 
this thinking to political agents. Instead of being conceived in 
terms of the deliberation of political actors deciding on possible 
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courses of future actions, judging now becomes "reflection on the 
past",. and in common with thinking, "such reflections will 
. (ll) 
inevitably arise in political emergencies . 
There is in Arendt's later writings an attempt to buttress her 
theory with yet another basic concept with which she became 
familiar during her study under Heidegger. This is the redirection 
of Husserlian phenomenology by Heidegger to interpret cultural 
and historical events as "self-disclosing". 
Arendt now defines politics as "phenomenality", as "self disclo-
sure in a space of appearances." Among the Greeks, "great deeds 
and great words were, in their greatness, as real as a stone or 
a house, there to be seen and heard by everybody present". 
Poets and historiographers merely attempt to preserve the glory 
that is already visible to al. It is in that that art and politics 
are connected. They both are phenomena of the public world. 
"The phenomenality of politics is therefore analogous to the 
(12) 
phenomenality of art". 
Yet, in order to become aware of appearance, we first must 
be free to establish a certain distance between ourselves and 
the object, and the more important the sheer appearance of a 
thing is, the more distance is required for its proper appreciation. 
"This distance cannot arise unless we are in a position to forget 
ourselves, the cares and interests and urges of our lives, so that 
we will not seize just what we admire, but let it be as it is, in 
(13) 
its appearance." 
Contemporary hermeneutic philosophy might find in this state-
ment of Arendt, which is basically similar to what Kant had 
made, a certain naivete, in that the self-forgetfulness, if complete, 
would not be able to motivate us to appreciate anything of the 
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past. Reflective awareness of the motivating interest as well as 
our own historicality has become admittedly an essential part of 
hermeneutic consciousness. But, when the last word is spoken, 
it is Hannah Arendt rather than hermeneutic philosophy that 
truly seems to provide the leverage of moral dimension to being 
a world spectator. "What is most important", says Arendt, 
"is that spectators participate in worldly events through 
sympathy, i. e. common sense". In her lecture-notes on Kant, 
she writes : The importance of the occurence is for him [Kant] 
exclusively in the eye of the beholder, in the opinion of 
onlookers who proclaim their attitude in public. Their reaction 
to the event proves the'moral character'of mankind. Without 
this sympathetic participation, the'meaning'of the occurence 
would be altogether different or simply nonexistent. For it 
(14) 
is the sympathy that inspires hope——. 
In conclusion, I will briefly touch on the impact the political 
philosophy of Hannah Arendt is having on Japan. As one might 
expect, it is in Women's Liberation movements and among the 
followers of Feminist studies that the voice of Arendt reverberates 
most. But Arendt herself never consciously lent herself or her 
thought to the cause of feminism. It is more with a view to 
future development of feminist studies that we see the relevance 
of Arendt's political philosophy to critical reappraisal of Japan's 
current curtural climate. 
Unlike postwar Germany, the cultural climate in Japan was such 
that what the Germans call "Vergangenheitsbewaltigung", or "to 
come to terms with the past", was seldom self-induced, and Japan 
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reacted only when one heinous deed after another came to be 
revealed by victims in neighboring nations or through the publica-
tion of US. State Department archive materials. In such a climate, 
it is heartening to see a feminist scholar like Aiko Ohkoshi, who, 
under the banner of Feminist Group for Cultural Deconstruction, 
challenges the Japanese society to come out of the closet where 
the traditional macho mentality of the Japanese male seems to 
(15) 
have left countless skeletons. The story of Japan's Imperial Army 
maintaining a large corps of so-called comfort-women has come 
to the fore only in the last several years. While these women 
were recruited exclusively from Japan's colonies, Ohkoshi sees 
the roots reaching far deeper in Japan's traditional sexual mores, 
and she has thrown down a gauntlet to Japan's male dominated 
society that has looked down on women as little more than 
commodities. But recrimination and revenge are not her last 
words. If Arendt spoke of "sympathetic participation", she also 
knew to draw from another source, and declared that what truly 
bonds nations together in brotherhood is "friendship", as she 
(16) 
stated in her Thought on Lessing. This spirit is what also motivated 
Dorothy Moorefield, when she appealed to the state to abolish 
capital punishment, transcending the agony and sorrow over the 
(17) 
loss of her own son who was brutally murdered. The point of 
view of a world-spectator means understanding the others and 
coming to terms with them. It is easier said than done, but then 
we have not even ventured to say anything for so long in the 
past. When we are truly able to make a free and responsible 
judgement, participation on the basis of this judgement, it is to 
be hoped, would become so much more compelling. 
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